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A B S T R A C T
There is a lively academic debate over whether political
cleavages in the European Union (EU) follow mainly terri-
torial (national) or non-territorial (ideological) patterns. This
article analyses the cleavages that structure the conflict over
European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system.
Taking positions on this major policy as an empirical
example, we test these competing theories on the nature of
cleavages on environmental policy issues in the EU. We use
data from an expert survey of more than 600 individuals to
fulfil this aim. The results show that neither of the hypoth-
eses is unequivocally supported. But the data indicate that
cleavages based on non-territorial interests are much more
important than territorial interests in explaining positions 
on REACH.
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Introduction
Following the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the European
Union (EU) has been transformed into a multi-level polity in which European
issues have become more and more contested. Traditionally, whereas much
effort has been put into determining the relative political strength of various
actors in EU policy-making, less attention has been paid to examining the
nature of political cleavages within the EU (see Treib, 2005). More recently
this has started to change, and there is now a number of studies dealing with
preferences and conflict structures within the European Commission
(Hooghe, 1999, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2001), the European Parliament (Hix
et al., 2006, 2007) and the Council of Ministers (Mattila, 2004; Zimmer et al.,
2005; Hagemann, 2007).
The literature on political contestation in EU politics is dominated by two
competing theories (Hooghe, 2000). The first assumes that conflicts in the EU
are primarily of territorial origin (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The second assumes
that EU policy reflects mainly non-territorial conflicts that resemble those in
domestic politics (Hix, 1999; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Tsebelis and Garrett,
2000).1 This article will put these theories to the empirical test by analysing
the cleavages that structure the conflict over European chemicals policy, the
so-called REACH system for the registration, evaluation and authorization of
chemicals (Commission, 2001, 2003). Analysis of this important policy – one
of the most widely debated law-making processes ever in the EU (Friedrich,
2007; Persson, 2007) – provides a good opportunity to assess the relative
merits of the two theoretical understandings of the structure of conflict on EU
policy: the international relations theories that emphasize territorial factors
and the domestic politics approaches stressing non-territorial factors. In 
order to test which of these factors is decisive for determining actors’ policy
positions on the supranational regulation of chemicals, we use data from a
unique expert survey with more than 600 respondents covering a multitude
of public and private actors.
The study thus extends previous research in the field in at least two
important respects. First, we answer Hix’s (1999: 93) old, but largely
neglected, plea for testing theories on the nature of contestation in EU politics
not only on official high-level EU representatives but on a multitude of actors
‘such as public and private interests groups, EU bureaucrats, national and
European parliamentarians, and national governments’. Second, our study
adds to current knowledge by considering regulations in the field of environ-
mental politics, an area that has received scant attention in previous studies
of the EU’s political space. Nonetheless, the field of environmental politics
appears a highly suitable testing ground for theories concerned with the
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nature of political contestation, since it is well known from studies of
domestic politics that environmental regulations have the potential to 
spur political mobilization along several dimensions, territorial as well as
non-territorial.
To preview the main results, we show that respondents’ views on
REACH are well captured by a single underlying dimension that taps actors’
attitudes toward extended supranational regulation of chemicals, and, more
importantly, that the political conflicts over the new regulatory system are
structured along non-territorial rather than territorial lines. As an interest-
ing aside we also show that the political battle on REACH is considerably
more complex than both the public debate and some previous research on
the subject (Pesendorfer, 2006) would lead us to believe.
We will proceed as follows. In the next section, the territorial and non-
territorial positions will be delineated from the existing literature. We formu-
late two hypotheses – one emphasizing territorial and one non-territorial
factors – which will be tested in the following sections. The second section
discusses the contentious issue of supranational regulation of chemicals. In
the third section the survey is presented, and in the fourth section we present
the empirical results. The structure of conflict over EU chemicals regulation
is explored and the territorial and non-territorial hypotheses are evaluated.
We conclude with a summary of our major findings and consider some
tentative lessons for the future.
Theorizing territorial and non-territorial contestation
The literature on cleavages and political contestation in the EU furnishes two
basic traditions. They represent different views about key actors and the
character of conflict over EU policy. The first assumes that conflict in the EU
is primarily based on territorial factors. This tradition is rooted in inter-
national relations theory and conceives European integration as an excep-
tional example of regional integration. But this line of theorizing comes in
two competing variants. Neofunctionalists (and their supranationalist suc-
cessors) see EU politics as structured by cleavages between pro-integration
and anti-integration forces. They argue that domestic interest groups, which
they expect increasingly to organize themselves transnationally, and supra-
national actors, such as the Commission, are the driving forces behind deeper
integration (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998;
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). Intergovernmentalists, in contrast,
consider EU politics to be structured by contestation between divergent
national interests. State governments rather than supranational actors are the
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key actors in the integration process (Hoffmann, 1982; Milward, 1992;
Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). The common ground in both these variants of inter-
national relations theory is that European integration is thought to take place
among rather than within countries (Hooghe, 2000).
In contrast, a growing number of scholars have begun to identify conflict
patterns in the EU that resemble domestic cleavage lines, such as the ubiqui-
tous left–right dimension (Hix, 1999; Hix and Lord, 1997; Hix et al., 2006, 2007;
Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Marks and Steenbergen, 2002, 2004). This approach
has been adopted by comparativists who explore European integration as an
extension of domestic politics. But this approach too comes in many variants.
Some scholars argue that EU politics is increasingly two-dimensional (Hix,
1999; Hix and Lord, 1997). The left–right dimension supplements, and is 
unrelated to, the pro- or anti-integration dimension. European integration
engages national sovereignty and mobilizes territorial groups, whereas
left–right contestation involves the allocation of values among functional
interests. Other scholars, on the other hand, argue that these two dimensions
are fused into a single dimension. The Left pushes for common economic
regulation across Europe, whereas the Right favours less EU regulation
(Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). Yet another line of theorizing considers these two
dimensions as being related to each other, although not all aspects of European
integration are easily incorporated into the left–right dimension. Left–right
contestation shapes actors’ positions only on European policies that are
concerned with redistribution and the regulation of capitalism (Hooghe and
Marks, 2001).
For the purpose of this paper, however, we will simplify by examining
only two models of contestation over EU policy: a territorial and a non-
territorial model. In the following two sections we will elaborate hypotheses
from these two approaches about how different factors may shape actors’
orientation to EU chemicals policy.
Territorial (national) interests
The liberal intergovernmentalist theory, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik
(1993, 1998), is the most elaborate theory that emphasizes territorial factors
as being decisive for conflict patterns in the EU. Moravcsik argues that the
preferences of national governments are shaped in interaction with powerful
domestic economic interests. In commercial policy areas, where the net
expected gains and losses are significant, producer interests will impose tight
constraints on government policy positions. Competitive producer interests
will accordingly push governments to favour liberalization, whereas less
competitive producers will oppose liberalization of commercial policy, such
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as internal market policy, agricultural policy, competition policy and indus-
trial policy. However, the importance of domestic interest groups varies
according to the policy area. In regulatory policy areas, such as consumer
protection or environmental or social policy, governments must strike a
balance between commercial interests and public goods provision. In these
areas the range of mobilized interests is typically broader than in commercial
policy. Since governments will try to avoid European policies that impose
major costs on their economies, richer countries with higher regulatory stan-
dards will defend their higher levels of protection, whereas poorer countries
with low standards will struggle against harmonization or for low standards
(Moravcsik, 1993: 488–94; 1998: 37–41; Treib, 2005). Hence, we can hypothesize
that national actors that follow this logic will seek to avoid European policy outcomes
that imply significant economic costs for domestic producers. Accordingly, countries
with large chemical industries will work against far-reaching supranational regu-
lations in this area.
A similar version of this argument would be that the most important
cleavage is between the richer and the poorer member states. The richer
northern European countries strive for high protection standards in regu-
latory areas that correct market failures such as environmental and consumer
protection or social policy, since they have already adopted strong domestic
regulatory frameworks. The poorer southern countries, in contrast, have
lower levels of environmental, consumer and social standards, and will there-
fore try to avoid high adaptation costs (Zimmer et al., 2005). In general,
environmental policy-making has been described in this fashion as being
composed of a single intergovernmental cleavage between ‘leader’ and
environmental ‘laggard’ countries (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998; Börzel,
2000, 2003; Sbragia, 2000). Simply put, the ‘leaders’ appear to be richer,
northern states, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark,
whereas the ‘laggards’ are the poorer, southern states, such as Greece, Spain,
Portugal and the new member states. Consequently, we can hypothesize that, in
general, actors representing richer countries will be more positive towards supra-
national regulations in market-correcting policy areas, such as consumer protection
and environmental or social policy, whereas representatives of poorer countries will
try to avoid high adaptation costs by opposing far-reaching supranational regulations
in these areas.
Non-territorial (ideological) interests
The arguments presented above leave no room for non-territorial political
factors to influence actors’ preferences. The basic premise is instead that pref-
erences on major EU issues are determined by economic interests depending
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on territorial belonging, rather than by ideological tastes across territories.
But it seems plausible to consider ideological or other political differences as
alternative causal determinants of actors’ preferences. As has been pointed
out by several authors (see, for example, Hix, 1999; Hix et al., 2006; Tsebelis
and Garrett, 2000), actor preferences may be multidimensional, concerning
not simply the question of integration but also other dimensions such as
environmental protection, consumer protection and, most importantly, the
traditional left and right scale.
Hooghe et al. (2002) have found that political left and right parties
support integration within specific policy areas. With regard to economic and
social policies, leftist parties are in favour of state intervention and market
regulation at supranational level. Christian democratic, conservative and
liberal parties strive for less state intervention and more free-market regu-
lation. Accordingly, left-wing parties generally support supranational policies
that regulate capitalism, including environmental policy, social policy and
employment policy. Right-wing parties, in contrast, are in general opposed
to integration in these areas. In sum, Hooghe et al. (2002) find that traditional
left–right contestation among domestic political parties can also be found at
the EU level, but only in policy areas that touch upon market regulation and
redistribution between social classes.
But other scholars have found in studies on West European policy spaces
that environmental issues are, in general, only moderately related to the
traditional left–right dimension (see, for example, Warwick, 2002). The cross-
cutting nature of this policy area implies that it is of concern primarily for
two opposing interests: on the one hand, the defenders of the environment
and human health, and, on the other, those defending the competitiveness of
European industry. This conflict pattern does not necessarily coincide with
the traditional left–right conflict. Consequently, the controversial chemicals
policy has been described primarily as a battle between two competing
‘coalitions’ advocating environmental protection and industrial interests,
regardless of their political belonging (e.g. Pesendorfer, 2006). The ‘green
coalition’ is generally considered to be composed of environment ministries
in member states, national environmental agencies and the Commission’s
Directorate-General (DG) for Environment, along with a number of EU-level
organizations such as the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and a couple of ‘green’ EU member
states. They all share a pro-regulation environmentalist approach. The
‘business coalition’ is generally considered to consist of the industry,
European business associations, the Commission’s DG Enterprise, national
economic affairs ministries and EU member states with a large chemical
sector, such as France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The
‘business coalition’ shares a neo-liberal agenda and wants to avoid stringent
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regulations and harmful barriers to trade, although they also encompass
left–wing political actors. Members of the European Parliament (EP) – and
accordingly the political parties and party groups they belong to – can be
found in both coalitions, although the EP is widely regarded as a progress-
ive actor in EU environmental policies (Lenschow, 2005).
According to this view, the two competing network coalitions, consisting
of actors from a variety of institutions and countries, advocate separate para-
digms based on a shared set of policy beliefs (Pesendorfer, 2006). In describ-
ing the battle over REACH in this way, as a trial of strength between
industrialists and environmentalists, it is implicitly assumed that political
contention is ideological rather than territorial. From this line of argument, it
can thus be hypothesized that in regulatory policy areas, such as consumer protec-
tion and environmental or social policy, actors’ preferences are primarily shaped by
non-territorial factors, such as basic ideological beliefs.
Testing the two logics
In order to test the territorial and the non-territorial hypotheses, there are
advantages to focusing on one specific policy area. Given that different policy
areas may be driven by different logics it seems more promising to look at
individual policy areas than to search for a single underlying dimension that
explains contestation across policy areas. Moreover, by focusing on one policy
area, we are able to make an in-depth assessment of policy positions in this
particular area. We consider the new chemicals policy as an excellent case for
the evaluation of our hypotheses. First, as argued by Hooghe et al. (2002), the
left–right dimension has an impact, in particular in policy areas that deal with
the trade-off between free markets and the regulation of them. Similarly,
Moravcsik identifies regulatory policies as an area in which economic
interests can come into conflict with other concerns. The EU chemicals policy
is certainly an area in which the competitiveness of European chemical
industries stands against environmental and health concerns. The EU
chemicals law thus emphasizes the linkage between environment and market
objectives. The cross-cutting nature of this policy implies that it will be of
concern for opposing interests and therefore reveal underlying political
conflicts, and as such, this area will provide a fair, although limited, test of
the territorial and non-territorial hypotheses.
The EU Chemicals Policy Review
The new EU chemicals regulation grew out of concerns about the main short-
comings of the existing regulatory framework. There is a general lack of
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knowledge regarding 99% of chemicals that were placed on the market before
1981 because prior to that date no stringent health and safety tests were needed
to market chemicals. The disparity between old and new chemicals has
resulted in a system that promotes the use of old untested chemicals and,
inversely, discourages the introduction of newer (safer) alternatives. Moreover,
it has been noted that the allocation of responsibilities between authorities and
manufacturers of chemicals is inappropriate. Today, authorities rather than
manufacturers are responsible for risk assessment, which involves lengthy
committee procedures. In order to remedy this imbalance, with the aim of
promoting human health and the environment as well as innovation, the
Commission brought forward a strategy for a revised future chemicals policy.
It responded to concerns raised at an informal Council of Environment
Ministers meeting in 1998 that the current policy on chemicals does not
provide sufficient protection. The new system replaces the current 40 legis-
lative texts with a single system (REACH) in which old and new substances
will be subject to the same procedures (Commission, 2001). It will ensure that
companies provide at least basic health and safety testing for around 30,000
substances currently used in everyday products (Hansson and Rudén, 2004).
However, in an international context, tough environmental requirements
for the chemicals industry have the potential to threaten one of Europe’s most
important business sectors. The chemicals industry is the third-largest
manufacturing industry in the EU, with 586 billion a year sales and gener-
ating 1.9 million jobs, which makes the EU the leading chemical-producing
area in the world. The EU is also the world’s leading exporter and importer
of chemicals (Cefic, 2005). Accordingly, the overall objectives of the REACH
directive, in line with the overriding goal of sustainable development, seek
to make the chemicals industry accept more responsibility while also safe-
guarding the Single Market and the competitiveness of European industry.
The draft legislation was the result of lengthy deliberations. Extensive
consultations with stakeholders as well as a series of meetings of technical
expert working groups followed the adoption of the White Paper in 2001,
produced under the co-responsibility of DG Environment and DG Enterprise.
Having gathered new information from this round of consultations with regu-
lators, scientists, businesses, downstream users, non-governmental organiz-
ations (NGOs) and representatives of member states and applicant countries,
the Commission revised a legislative draft proposal. Stakeholders and the
general public were then invited to a public Internet consultation with 
the aim of assessing the workability of the proposed REACH system. After
the closure of the consultation, the Commission analysed the contributions
and was set to make appropriate changes to the proposal. After adoption 
in the College of Commissioners in October 2003, Commissioner Margot 
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Wallström (Environment) and Erkki Likkanen (Enterprise) jointly presented
the final proposal for a new EU regulatory framework for chemicals
(Commission, 2003). This final version of the REACH proposal, which the
Commission sent to the Council and the European Parliament in November
2003, launched a flood of reactions from the chemical industry and environ-
ment NGOs alike. After marathon talks, however, the EU’s two law-making
bodies – the European Parliament and the Council – came to a compromise
agreement on the draft REACH regulation on 30 November 2006. The
compromise package was adopted by the plenary of the European Parliament
on 13 December 2006 and by the Council by unanimity on 18 December 2006.
The general criterion for priority-setting in REACH, as well as in previous
regulations, is the production volume of each chemical. It is used to assign
different test requirements to substances so that higher production volumes
impose more extensive testing. The basic rationale for using production
volume as a priority-setting tool is that it can be used as a proxy for potential
risks. This has been one of the debated issues regarding REACH, along with
issues such as the general applicability of the precautionary principle, that is,
that risk-reducing actions should be taken even if there is uncertainty about
the precise nature or magnitude of potential damage, and the substitution prin-
ciple, that is, that hazardous substances are to be replaced by safer alternatives
whenever possible (Eckley and Selin, 2004; Pesendorfer, 2006). Moreover, the
powers of the proposed European Chemicals Agency have been debated, as
well as the extent to which companies will be able to submit group appli-
cations in consortia when registering similar substances with the agency, that
is, the ‘One Substance, One Registration’ (OSOR) principle.
The online survey
An electronic online survey was constructed in order to make it possible to
gather the opinions of roughly 2000 potential respondents who had been, in
one way or another, involved in the discussions on REACH. These actors can
be considered as key actors in the formation and processing of the REACH
proposal from the White Paper in 2001 until the EP and Council first readings
in autumn 2005.
But the entire population of actors who have participated in the law-
making process on REACH is in fact impossible to determine. Since REACH
is one of the most widely debated issues in EU history, thousands or perhaps
tens of thousands of actors have been involved. The aim instead is to include
all relevant actors, namely influential actors who reflect the spectrum of
positions taken regarding the new EU chemicals regulatory system. Accord-
ingly, we try to capture all actors who either have been working with REACH
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within the EU institutions or have been interacting with the EU institutions
during the REACH law-making process. Two criteria were specified for
including individuals in the survey: (1) actors with positions in the
Commission, the European Parliament and the Council who have actively
been working with REACH, and (2) actors who have been panel discussants,
keynote speakers or workshop participants in EU conferences on REACH.
Hence, our selection of respondents is based on both positions and partici-
pation (Scott, 1991/2000). Involvement in decision-making can be seen as an
affiliation, just like any official position with relevance to REACH. These
actors include representatives of the Commission, the Parliament, the
Council, member state governments and public authorities, governments and
public authorities in candidate countries, governments and public authorities
in third countries, industry and business associations, individual firms,
NGOs, other civil society associations, political parties, academic institutions
and individual citizens.
In total, 1951 actors were sampled out of whom 175, for various reasons,
were excluded; 651 actors responded to the survey, which is a response rate
of 37%.2 The relatively low response rate is partly due to the fact that this
was an online enquiry conducted with, for the most part, elite officials from
a multitude of organizations, which means that they are normally quite busy
people. Moreover, we received very few replies from people in the Parlia-
ment (only 16% of those who were sent the survey). If, for instance, all
respondents from the EP are excluded, the response rate rises to 46%.3 The
absolute and relative number of respondents from different countries and
institutions/organizations and the representation of different categories of
interests are presented in the appendix. Finally, the survey was designed in
a way that allowed us to gather information about respondents’ current
professional situation, their nationality, their level of engagement with
regard to REACH and their views on a number of contentious issues regard-
ing the REACH proposal during the EP and Council first reading.
The structure of conflict over EU chemicals 
policy-making
Given the complexity of REACH, it seems a futile exercise to attempt to
capture actors’ views on the proposal by means of a single question. At the
stage of study design, we therefore decided to focus on seven of the most
contentious issues regarding the REACH proposal during the EP and Council
first reading. These issues were: (i) the OSOR proposal (‘One Substance, One
Registration’); (ii) test requirements for low-volume chemicals; (iii) the
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‘burden of proof’ on the industry instead of the public authorities; (iv) the
responsibilities of the European Chemicals Agency; (v) the substitution prin-
ciple; (vi) the precautionary principle; and (vii) the limiting of animal testing
(complete questions are presented in the appendix). Survey respondents were
asked to what extent they agreed with each of these proposals, and responses
were recorded on a scale running from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree).
A first question to ask is to what extent these seven items can be said to
reflect a common underlying dimension. That is, is it the case that a respon-
dent who happens to agree with a particular proposal is also more likely to
agree with the other six proposals? The way to answer this question is by
exploratory factor analysis. The results from such an analysis are presented
in Table 1.
The most widely applied criterion to determine the number of factors
(dimensions) in exploratory factor analysis is the Kaiser criterion, which says
that only factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1 should be retained (Kaiser,
1960). The results in the table refer to the single factor meeting this criterion.
There is thus at least some evidence in favour of the view that respondents’
answers to the various items reflect a single underlying dimension. To judge
from the wording of the questions, this dimension taps respondents’ overall
support for extended supranational regulation of chemicals, since agreeing to
the seven statements usually implies that the respondents are in favour of a
new and more far-reaching form of regulation at the EU level. The one
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Table 1 Factor analysis of items relating to the REACH proposal
Item Factor loadings
OSOR proposal .50
Test requirements for low-volume chemicals .14
The burden of proof .52
Responsibilities of European Chemicals Agency .14
The substitution principle .76
The precautionary principle .82
Limiting animal testing .32
Eigenvalue 1.92
Number of cases 457
Notes: The factor analysis was conducted in Stata using the maximum likelihood method. The
initial analysis retained three factors but since only one of these factors had an eigenvalue larger
than 1 the model was re-estimated with the number of factors restricted to one. The 457
individuals included in the analysis are those, out of the 651 survey respondents, who provided
answers to all seven items.
exception is the question of whether there should be a partial exemption for
low-volume chemicals. This is because a higher score (more agreement) on
this question should reflect a less regulatory stance since those opposing this
proposal most likely hold the view that test requirements should be equally
strict for low-volume chemicals and high-volume chemicals. Therefore the
coding of the answers to this question was reversed before conducting the
factor analysis.
Although the variation in respondent answers to the seven substantive
questions is reasonably well captured by a single underlying dimension, it is
clear from the factor loadings presented in Table 1 that not all items are
equally closely related to this underlying factor. Whereas respondents’
support for the substitution and precautionary principles says a lot about their
views on the need for further regulation of chemicals, respondents’ support
for partial exemptions for low-volume chemicals and the introduction of a
European Chemical Agency seems much less closely related to their opinions
on this matter. To some extent, however, this pattern is to be expected. Among
the various REACH proposals the substitution and precautionary principles
are those with the most far-reaching economic and environmental conse-
quences, and it is therefore only natural that these are the two proposals most
closely related to actors’ overall support for extended supranational regu-
lation of chemicals. The relatively modest factor loading for the low-volume
chemical question (.14) is most likely owing to the fact that the question is
somewhat ambiguous, in that it may not have been obvious to all respon-
dents whether the alternative to a partial exemption for low-volume chemi-
cals was complete exemption or no exemption at all. The equally low factor
loading of the question concerning whether a new European Chemical
Agency should be trusted with the management of the REACH system may
be attributed to the fact that this question taps not only respondents’ views
on the need for regulation, but also their opinions about which institution
should oversee the system.
All in all, however, the results from the factor analysis suggest that it is
reasonable to order the actors’ views on REACH along a single dimension
measuring their overall support for further regulation of chemicals. The most
frequently used method to locate the position of actors on an underlying
dimension is by computing so-called factor scores. Mathematically the factor
scores are simply a weighted average of the (standardized) items loading on
a specific factor. The weights are based on the factor loadings of the items so
that items that load high on a specific factor are of greater importance for the
placement of individuals on that factor than items with low factor loadings.
In the case at hand, this means that, in measuring respondents’ overall
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support for extended regulation of chemicals, greatest weight will be given
to their views on the substitution and precautionary principles.
Admittedly, the predicted score will be an error-prone measure of the true
factor (e.g. Steiger, 1979). The relevant question, however, is not whether the
constructed factor scores differ from the scores of the true factor, but whether
they correspond more closely to the scientific concept of interest than any of
the observed indicators do. In the case at hand, we believe that the answer
to this question is yes. In what follows we therefore use the factor scores,
based on the results presented in Table 1, as our measure of respondents’ atti-
tudes toward extended regulation of chemicals at the EU level. In order to
ease interpretation we have normalized these scores to vary between 0 and
1. It turns out that respondents who totally agree with the proposal of partial
exemption for low-volume chemicals but totally disagree with the other six
proposals obtain a 0 score on this new scale, whereas respondents holding
the opposite views on each of these items obtain a score of 1.
What determines actors’ positions on REACH?
As previously discussed, there is a lively academic debate over whether politi-
cal cleavages in the EU are mainly territorial or non-territorial in nature. In
this section we examine how well these two types of theories can explain the
divergent views on the need for regulatory reform found among the actors
participating in the decision-making process on REACH.
According to scholars who argue that political conflict within the EU is
primarily structured along territorial lines, national economic interests are the
prime determinant of actors’ opinions about REACH. In line with the
discussion of the theoretical section, we will use two indicators of national
economic interests. First, we will use the turnover of the chemicals industry
– as a share of GDP – to account for the variation in the relative importance
of the chemical industry across countries. The assumption here is that, since
new regulations will, at least initially, impose additional costs on industry,
actors from countries with a large chemical sector should be less likely to
support far-reaching environmental regulations. Second, we will examine the
validity of the argument that richer countries, in general, are more positive
toward regulation by investigating to what extent respondents’ views on
REACH co-vary systematically with GDP per capita in their home countries.
The great bulk of previous research on the importance of non-territorial
factors in structuring EU politics has been concerned with the question of
whether actors’ views on European issues can be read from their positions
on the left–right dimension (for example, Hix, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2002). As
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is well known from studies of domestic politics, however, views on environ-
mental issues are usually less closely related to the left–right dimension than,
for instance, are views on welfare issues (Warwick, 2002). Self-placements on
the left–right dimension are therefore not an optimal measure if we want to
gauge the relative merits of non-territorial factors in explaining actors’
positions on REACH. A better alternative, and the one we have opted for,
may simply be to ask the actors to state the interest they represent. In our
survey we asked the respondents which of the following seven interests they,
first and foremost, would consider themselves as a representative of: environ-
mental, consumer, animal welfare, health, workers’, industry/business, or
general interests.4 To the extent that non-territorial factors structure actors’
views on REACH we would expect to find a systematic relationship between
the interests that actors represent and their views on the proposal. This is a
more general measure of non-territorial interests than a measure capturing
solely ideological orientations on the left–right dimension.
In order to examine whether actors’ views on REACH are primarily
driven by territorial or non-territorial interests, we regress the regulatory
index, discussed in the previous section, on these two types of interests. The
regression results are presented in Table 2.
The first two models show the separate effects of territorial and non-
territorial interests, respectively. In Model 1, actors’ views on REACH are
assumed to be determined solely by national interests. The performance of
this model is, indeed, bleak. The turnover share of the chemical industry and
GDP per capita jointly account for less than 0.5% of the variation in the
dependent variable (R2 < .005). Although the former variable enters with 
the expected sign – respondents whose home countries are large chemical
producers are less likely to support far-reaching regulations – this coefficient
is not statistically significant. GDP per capita, on the other hand, not only is
statistically insignificant but the coefficient also has the wrong sign, on the
basis of the intergovernmentalist theory, indicating that, if anything, respon-
dents from rich countries are less likely to support chemical regulations.
Turning to our measure of non-territorial interests (Model 2) we see that
these interests account for about 16% of the variation in the regulatory index
across respondents. Admittedly, the fit of the model is far from perfect, but
at least the fit of Model 2 is considerably better than that of Model 1. This
could be taken to indicate that non-territorial interests are more important in
explaining actors’ views on REACH than are territorial interests.
In order to give a more substantive interpretation of the results in 
Model 2 we must first note that environmental interests constitute the
reference category for the regression. That is, from the regression coefficient
of a particular interest we can read off the (mean) placement of the respon-
dents representing this particular interest relative to the placement of the 
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respondents representing environmental interests. Respondents representing
workers’ interests, for instance, are on average .12 units (12 percentage
points) ‘less positive’ towards regulatory reforms compared with respon-
dents representing environmental interests. These results can also be
presented graphically. In Figure 1, the results from Model 2 are used to calcu-
late the expected value of the regulatory index for each type of interest.
Looking at the placement of various interests along the regulatory dimen-
sion, we find, somewhat unexpectedly, that respondents representing animal
welfare interests are most opposed to the introduction of new regulations.
One reason for this may be that these respondents fear that stricter regulations
of chemicals could lead to more animal testing. That said, the reader is
advised to take this finding with a large pinch of salt, since only six of the
respondents included in the analysis represent animal welfare interests.
If we set animal welfare interests aside, we see that respondents repre-
senting industry and environmental interests are located at different ends of
the scale. This finding could be taken as supporting Pesendorfer’s (2006)
conclusion that the decision-making process on REACH should be viewed as
a battle between two competing advocacy coalitions, one advocating indus-
trial interests and the other advocating environmental interests. But, as should
be clear from the figure, this description conceals as much as it reveals.
Admittedly, industry and environmental interests are situated at opposing
ends of the spectrum, but apart from that the data do not seem to support
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.4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Environmental interests 
Health interests
Workers’ interests
General interests
Consumer interests
Industry interests
Animal welfare interests
Position on REACH 
Figure 1 The mean placement on REACH for various non-territorial interests.
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the view of two distinct clusters. On the contrary, the various interests are
quite evenly distributed along the regulatory dimension.
The views of representatives of health interests come closest to those rep-
resenting environmental interests. The mean positions of these two groups are,
in fact, statistically indistinguishable. At the other end of the spectrum we see,
somewhat surprisingly, that the views on REACH of the respondents rep-
resenting consumer interests are considerably closer to the views of industry
than to the views of environmentalists. Statistically speaking, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that consumer and industry interests share the same views on
REACH.5 To make sense of this finding, one can hypothesize that consumers
are, on the one hand, concerned about consumer prices and the quality of the
products they buy, while on the other hand they are also concerned about the
environmental and health risks of consuming these products. The respondents
representing workers and general interests, finally, are situated half-way
between the industry and environment representatives. The positions taken
by the former two types of representatives are also statistically distinguishable
from the positions of the two latter interests, respectively.6 Although industry
and business interests, quite naturally, will be most concerned about the
competitiveness of the European chemical industry, workers and trade union-
ists might share this concern. They are concerned about losing jobs in Europe.
At the same time, they might be concerned about the dangers connected with
the handling of chemical substances in the everyday working environments
of many workers in European manufacturing industries. This may explain
why worker representatives take a middle position on REACH.
To judge from the first two models, non-territorial interests are much
more important than territorial interests in explaining actors’ differing views
on REACH. But it is possible, although not particularly likely, that the
relationship is reversed once we include both types of interests in the same
model. That this is not the case can be seen from the results of Model 3. The
effects of the two types of interests on actors’ views on REACH are more or
less the same when examined jointly as when examined separately. This
finding strengthens the view that positions on REACH are structured along
non-territorial rather than territorial lines.7
Models 4 and 5 provide two different types of robustness checks of the
results. In Model 4 we control for the respondents’ organizational affiliation,
as well as for their level of involvement in the REACH process. These 
two variables can be viewed as crude controls for the influence of
supranationalist preferences. For reasons of space we do not report the
coefficient estimates, but the results show that neither organizational affili-
ation nor the degree of involvement in the policy process is an important
determinant of actors’ views on REACH. Most importantly, however, we see
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that our earlier findings withstand these controls. In Model 5 we restrict the
sample to include only respondents whose home countries are members of
the EU. As can be seen, the results for this more restricted sample are almost
identical to those obtained for the larger sample.
According to the aggregate results presented so far, respondents’ views
on REACH are mainly determined by non-territorial factors. However, it might
be feared that these results conceal important differences between various
types of actors. To see whether this is the case, we now examine representa-
tives of interests groups (Model 6), national government representatives
(Model 7) and representatives of EU institutions (Model 8) separately. By and
large, the results in Models 6–8 buttress our previous findings. Clearly, the
regulatory preferences are structured along non-territorial lines in all three
subgroups. The coefficients of the interests dummies are also strikingly similar
across the different samples. The only notable exception is the category of
workers’ interests.8 We see that it is mainly governmental officials represent-
ing workers’ interests who oppose extensive chemical regulations. Finally, we
do not find support for the hypotheses about the impact of territorial factors
in any of the three groups studied. Although the coefficient of GDP per capita
is statistically significant for the subsample of governmental representatives,
the coefficient is wrongly signed, respondents from rich countries appearing
less, not more, likely to support extensive chemical regulations. Given that
theoretical arguments about the primacy of territorial cleavages within the EU
often are geared towards explaining government preferences, it is especially
interesting to note that even among the group of national government rep-
resentatives non-territorial interests appear much more important than terri-
torial interests in explaining actors’ attitudes on REACH. Consequently, the
use of aggregate data do not seem to distort our substantive findings.
Before closing this section we shall, however, briefly consider two
additional caveats. First, admittedly the turnover share of the chemical
industry and GDP per capita are not the only possible indicators of territorial
interests. For instance, it has been suggested that the regulatory preferences of
individual member states may depend on their status as net contributors to or
net receivers of EU funds. According to Zimmer et al. (2005: 417), the net
receivers will, in general, prefer more extensive regulations whereas 
the net contributors in the EU system will advocate greater competition (see
also Treib, 2005). However, we find little evidence for such an effect in our data.
Regardless of whether we include net contributions per capita or a dummy
variable differentiating net contributors from net receivers in our analyses, the
resulting coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.9
A second caveat refers to the relationship between territorial and non-
territorial interests. In particular, it is a problem if the ‘national background’
of a respondent affects both the likelihood that he or she will represent a
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particular type of non-territorial interest and his or her views on REACH, since
we will then underestimate the role played by territorial interests. Obviously,
we can give no guarantee that our results are not driven by such a selection
effect (this would require an experimental study). With that said, we find no
clear signs of important selection effects in our data. The distributions of non-
territorial interests appear fairly similar across countries and the non-territorial
interests represented by individual respondents are largely unrelated to our
observable indicators of national interests.10 Yet the importance of selection
effects for studies of political contestation within the EU undoubtedly con-
stitutes an important area for future research.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study has been to assess the political cleavages that struc-
ture the conflict over the new regulatory system for chemicals (REACH) within
the EU, which stands out as one of the largest and most controversial law-
making processes in EU history. Chemicals policy highlights the necessity for
the European Union to strike an appropriate balance between economic
competitiveness and environmental protection. The REACH regulation has
consequently been subject to an intense struggle between competing interests.
This makes chemicals policy an excellent testing ground for examining the
nature of political contestation in EU politics. More specifically, we have tested
whether actors’ positions on REACH primarily follow territorial (national)
patterns, dividing respondents from countries with high and low adaptation
costs, or non-territorial (ideological) patterns, separating environmental repre-
sentatives from business representatives.
A first finding of the analysis is that actors’ views on REACH are well
captured by a single underlying dimension that taps respondents’ attitudes
toward supranational regulation of chemicals; that is, opinions about REACH
are ordered along a single scale running from anti- to pro-regulation. Second,
and more importantly, we show that the political conflicts over REACH are
structured along ideological, not territorial, lines. The type of interest that
actors represent accounts for a considerably larger share of the variation in
attitudes toward the REACH proposal than do territorial factors such as the
national importance of the chemical industry or the level of national economic
development. Or, to put it slightly differently, according to our results,
whether an actor represents business or environmental interests is much more
important in determining his or her policy position on REACH than is the
actor’s national background.
That said, we also find – in contrast to much of the public debate, as well
as to some previous research – that the pattern of contestation over the EU
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regulation of chemicals is not as simple as being composed only of two
competing advocacy coalitions positioned at either end of the policy
spectrum, namely environmentalists vs. industrialists. On the contrary, our
analysis shows that important interest groups, such as workers and
consumers, are positioned in between these two extremes. In fact, the views
of consumer representatives are found to be closer to those of business repre-
sentatives than to those of environmental representatives, a finding sharply
at odds with conventional wisdom (see, for example, Pesendorfer, 2006).
Moreover, the fact that there is no gulf between the views on REACH of
business and worker representatives indicates that the issue is not simply one
of left or right, but that there is some room for an anti-regulation cross-class
coalition between European labour and capital on environmental issues of
this type. A likely reason for this is that workers and trade unionists share a
concern for the competitiveness of the European chemical industry, since jobs
will be lost if production moves out of Europe.
Unlike previous analyses of the importance of non-territorial cleavages in
European politics (for example, Hooghe, 1999, 2001; Hix, 1999; Hix et al., 2007),
this study is not restricted to the political attitudes of parliamentarians and
high-level officials within the Commission, but considers the preferences of a
larger set of policy-makers, also including, for instance, representatives of
business, workers and environmental organizations. Against the background
of the ongoing transformation of the EU into a multi-level polity this is an
important addition to the literature, since this means that EU policy-making
frequently will include a multitude of public and private actors. Our results
indicate that this transformation of the EU is likely to make territorial cleav-
ages less salient in EU politics and strengthen the graduation from integration
to politics (Hix, 1999). Therefore, in order to develop an even better under-
standing of the nature of political contestation within the EU, we believe
scholars are well advised to continue the work on refurbishing and advanc-
ing the ‘domestic politics approach’ to European issues, stressing the import-
ance of various non-territorial sources of contention in EU politics. Yet it would
be premature completely to dismiss the importance of territorial sources of
conflict within the EU based on a single case study of an individual policy
area. More research is needed to provide a more definite answer to the question
of the relative importance of territorial and non-territorial factors.
The findings, as well as the limitations of the current study, raise several
avenues for future research on this topic. Most importantly, in order to
determine the generalizability of our results scholars should conduct similar
analyses of other policy areas, such as the EU’s social or structural policy. Other
possible extensions of the present work could be to consider alternative in-
dicators of territorial and non-territorial interests or to examine potential
interactions between territorial and non-territorial sources of contestation.
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Dependent variable
Weighted index, based on factor analysis, of seven items from the question-
naire. The respondents were asked to state to what extent they agreed with
each of the following propositions (1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree).
1 ‘Adoption of the OSOR proposal (One Substance, One Registration) will
improve the REACH system.’
2 ‘Test requirements for low-volume chemicals (1–10 tonnes produced or
imported per year) should be lighter than for higher volumes.’
3 ‘The “burden of proof” should be on industry instead of on public
authorities for testing and risk assessment of chemicals.’
4 ‘The European Chemicals Agency should have full responsibility for the
management of the REACH system.’
5 ‘When a safer chemical or technology is available at a reasonable cost,
chemical producers and users should be required to adopt safer
alternatives.’
6 ‘The precautionary principle should be a guiding principle of REACH,
i.e. that decision-making must be based on precaution in order to prevent
damage to human health and the environment.’
7 ‘Limiting animal testing should be one of the guiding principles of
REACH.’
Independent variables
GDP/capita. Gross domestic product per capita, current prices (US dollars) in
2004. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.
Involvement. Respondents were asked the following question: ‘How would you
consider your overall involvement in the REACH process? Please mark your
opinion on a scale ranging from 1 = none at all, to 7 = intensively involved.’
Organizational affiliation. The respondents were asked the following question:
‘What is your current institutional/organisational affiliation: i) European
Commission, ii) Council of the European Union, iii) European Parliament, 
iv) Other EU Institution/Authority, v) Industry Association, vi) Private
Business/Foundation, vii) Trade Union, viii) NGO, ix) Academic and
Technical Institute, x) International Organisation, xi) Member State
Government/Public Authority, xii) Applicant Country Government/Public
Authority, xiii) Third Country Government/Public Authority, xiv) Other.’
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Representational interest. Respondents were asked the following question:
‘Which of the following interests would you primarily consider yourself as
a representative of: i) Environmental interests, ii) Consumer interests, 
iii) Animal welfare interests, iv) Health interests, v) Workers’ interests, vi)
Industry/Business interests, vii) Private interests, viii) General interests, 
ix) Other interests.’
Turnover share. Overall turnover in the chemical industry (domestic + export
sales) as a percentage of GDP. Sources: European Chemical Industry Council
(Cefic, 2005) and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2006.
Further details on the survey
In total 651 respondents answered the online survey. In Table 3, the absolute
and relative numbers of respondents for each category are presented. In
Table 4, the absolute and relative numbers of respondents from different
countries are presented. In Table 5, the absolute and relative numbers of
respondents representing different categories of interests are presented.
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Table 3 Number and share of individuals representing different categories of actors
in the survey
Number of Share of 
Actors respondents respondents (%)
European Commission 56 8.6
Council of the European Union 7 1.1
European Parliament 87 13.4
Other EU institutions/authorities 8 1.2
Industry associations 90 13.8
Private businesses/foundations 89 13.7
Trade unions 39 6.0
NGOs 56 8.6
International organisations 9 1.4
Member state governments/public authorities 145 22.3
Applicant country governments/public authorities 4 0.6
Third country governments/public authorities 11 1.7
Academic and technical institutes 30 4.6
Other 20 3.1
Total 651 100.0
Note: Applicant countries at the time of the survey were Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
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Table 4 Number and share of participants in the survey from different countries
Number of Share of 
Country respondents respondents (%)
Austria 33 5.1
Belgium 47 7.2
Denmark 27 4.1
Finland 16 2.5
France 44 6.8
Germany 91 14.0
Greece 11 1.7
Ireland 13 2.0
Italy 37 5.7
Luxembourg 8 1.2
Netherlands 46 7.1
Portugal 11 1.7
Spain 23 3.5
Sweden 43 6.6
United Kingdom 66 10.1
EU 15 516 79.3
Cyprus 2 0.3
Czech Republic 9 1.4
Estonia 6 0.9
Hungary 11 1.7
Latvia 5 0.8
Lithuania 6 0.9
Malta 4 0.6
Poland 9 1.4
Slovakia 11 1.7
Slovenia 11 1.7
EU10 74 11.4
EU25 590 90.6
Applicant countries 9 1.4
Third countries 42 6.5
Unknown 10 1.5
Total 651 100.0
Note: Applicant countries at the time of the survey were Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Turkey and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Notes
This article arises out of research funded by the Foundation for Strategic Environ-
mental Research, Mistra. Author names are in alphabetical order and they share
equal responsibility for the manuscript. We wish to thank the participants at the
EU seminar at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, for their
useful comments. Our thanks are also due to the editor Gerald Schneider and
three anonymous referees for careful reading and thoughtful suggestions, and to
Thomas Göransson for valuable research assistance in data collection.
1 We follow the terminology used by Hooghe (2000) when we speak of ‘terri-
torial’ and ‘non-territorial’ cleavages, although ‘national’ and ‘ideological’
cleavages are sometimes used to denote the same phenomena.
2 Addresses were not found for 135 respondents, 24 answered that they had
not participated in the REACH process, 6 reported that they were on parental
leave, 4 were retired and 6 people were deceased. In total, the actual sample
thus consisted of 1776 actors.
3 Respondents had the option of choosing between five languages in which to
answer the survey: English, French, German, Spanish or Italian. The survey
was sent out to each potential respondent at three mailing rounds between
12 December 2005 and 28 March 2006. In addition, all remaining potential
respondents were sent an individually addressed e-mail reminder (written in
English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, Swedish or Polish depending on
to whom it was addressed) between 17 May and 2 June 2006. The survey was
finally closed on 19 June 2006.
4 Private interests were also among the alternatives, but since only two respon-
dents stated this interest we will not consider this alternative.
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Table 5 Number and share of participants in the survey representing different
interests
Number of Share of 
Interests respondents respondents (%)
Environmental interests 137 21.0
Consumer interests 29 4.5
Animal welfare interests 8 1.2
Health interests 66 10.1
Workers’ interests 65 10.0
Industry/business interests 164 25.2
Private interests 2 0.3
General interests 90 13.8
Other interests 14 2.2
Unknown 76 11.7
Total 651 100.0
5 The statistical results proving this statement are available from the authors
upon request.
6 The statistical results proving this proposition as well as the one above –
concerning the non-distinguishability of consumer and industry interests –
are available from the authors upon request.
7 One reviewer suggests that, in order to strengthen our results, we should
control for some kind of ideological measurement, such as left–right place-
ment. Unfortunately, except for Members of the European Parliament – for
whom we have information about their party affiliation – our survey includes
no questions about respondents’ ideological placement. It is, however,
comforting to note that the main results remain intact also if we re-estimate
our model on the subset of parliamentarians (48 respondents) for whom the
necessary information is available and replace our dummies of non-territorial
interests with another set of dummies indicating respondents’ party group
affiliation. In this analysis the coefficients of turnover share and GDP per
capita still turn out to be statistically insignificant, whereas we find some,
although weak support, for the view that views on REACH are structured
along party lines (the complete results are available upon request). Nonethe-
less, as argued above, given that environmental issues, in general (Warwick,
2002), and REACH, in particular (Pesendorfer, 2006), cut across the traditional
left–right dimension, we believe that the wider measure of non-territorial
interests used in this article is preferable to a measure based on left–right
placement.
8 The results for animal welfare interests are reported only for consistency with
previous models. But since there is only a single representative for this type
of interest in both Models 7 and 8, the reader should not attach too much
significance to the estimates of this variable.
9 The results are not reported for reasons of space, but they are available from
the authors upon request.
10 It is possible to estimate the strength of the relationship between, on the one
hand, the turnover share in the chemical industry and GDP per capita and,
on the other hand, each of the seven dummy indicators of non-territorial
interests by means of so-called polyserial correlation coefficients. All corre-
lation coefficients turn out to be small in magnitude. The largest correlation
coefficient is no higher than .17 (between the turnover share in the chemical
industry and the dummy variable indicating business interests) and only 2
out of 14 pairwise correlation coefficients indicate a statistically significant
relationship. The complete results are available from the authors upon
request.
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